Certificate Integrity
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Astraea

Version 0.4.8 (public beta)

Astraea is the goddess of precision and weighs the scales of good versus evil.

Certificate integrity for Asuswrt-Merlin, built on trusted time.

  • Astraea checks the certificates of the sites your devices visit, from the router, and flags the ones that look like interception or a DNS hijack.
  • It observes and flags only. Nothing is blocked, nothing is installed on your devices, and there is no TLS proxy.
  • It needs Kairos, which keeps the router on authenticated (NTS) time.

Why the time matters: certificate dates mean nothing unless the clock judging them is right. Astraea judges nothing until the time is trusted: chronyd synchronised and following a source that cannot be forged from outside: an NTS-authenticated server, a local reference clock (GPS, PPS), or a time server on the LAN (private IPv4 address). A plain-NTP server on the internet is not trusted.

Astraea looks for real discrepancies with as few alerts as possible. She stays quiet nearly all the time, so that when she speaks, it matters.

What to do with a finding:

  • Info: nothing to do.
  • Medium: usually a site's own quirk (a CDN move, a CAA record). astraea check <site> shows the certificate if you are curious.
  • High: act on it. Check the site from another network (a phone on cellular works), and do not log in there from this network until you know why.

What it does

  1. Learns which sites your network uses from the DNS query log: AdGuard Home's API when AdGuard Home answers DNS, on the router or on another LAN box; Pi-hole 6 or later on another LAN box (its API); otherwise dnsmasq's query log (stock dnsmasq, Diversion, or Unbound behind dnsmasq; install offers to turn log-queries on, writing to a log of Astraea's own in RAM, /tmp/astraea-dnsmasq.log, kept small, so lookups never go to the system log or to flash; Diversion's own query log is read where it is). Install finds an AdGuard Home or Pi-hole on your LAN by itself and asks one question and the login. Queries AdGuard Home blocked, names that resolve only to private addresses, and private names (.lan, .local, your LAN domain, ...) are skipped.

  2. Checks each site's certificate from the router: one TLS handshake on port 443, at most one every 2 seconds, each site again after 24 hours, at the address the DNS log shows a device was actually given (so it sees what that device was sent to; the router looks the name up itself only when there is none, or it no longer answers). The router's OpenSSL checks it against the router's own clock and CA bundle. Every finding and its severity:

    Finding Severity
    Expired, or not valid yet high*
    Does not cover the site's name high*
    Self-signed, or from a private CA (a root that is not publicly trusted) high*
    Chain does not reach a trusted root (a private CA, or the server does not send its intermediate) medium*
    Issuer changed to a certificate that is not publicly trusted or not CT-logged high
    Issuer changed to another publicly trusted, CT-logged CA within the site's usual network, allowed by its CAA (or none) accepted quietly (info for a week)
    Issuer changed in a new network, where independent resolvers point, the same CA's certificate for the same names answers (another edge of the same CDN) accepted quietly (info for a week)
    Issuer changed to another publicly trusted, CT-logged CA from a network the site never used, or one its CAA does not allow medium
    Issuer, key and network all changed, and independent resolvers confirm the site is there (a move to another CDN) medium
    Issuer changed together with a new key and an address in a network the site never used, not confirmed by independent resolvers (the shape of a DNS hijack) high
    Same CA, but a certificate under 3 days old with a new key, at an address in a new network, where independent resolvers point elsewhere (and neither the same key nor the same CA and names answers there) medium; asked again at the next check and resolved once they agree, gone after a week
    DANE mismatch: the site's DNSSEC-signed TLSA record pins another key, and the key is new to the site or the certificate is not valid and CT-logged high
    DANE mismatch with a valid, CT-logged certificate and the site's usual key (a stale record) medium, ackable
    A Certificate Transparency timestamp in the future by NTS-trusted time high
    CAA mismatch: the site's DNS CAA record does not allow the CA that issued its certificate medium when the certificate was issued in the last 30 days, or comes with a new issuer or a new network; otherwise info (the record was most likely changed after the certificate was issued)
    Your resolver shows no CAA record where independent resolvers see one (cross-check on) info; medium when it is still missing 3 hours later (a resolver cache explains the first hours)
    No embedded Certificate Transparency proof (SCTs) medium
    Valid for more than 398 days medium
    Weak key or signature (RSA < 2048, EC < 256, SHA-1/MD5) medium
    Start date more than 2 days before the CT logs saw it (backdated) info
    CA bundle updated with Entware (ca-bundle package): roots added and removed info
    New root added to the router's CA bundle without an Entware update medium
    Roots removed from the router's CA bundle without an Entware update info

    * Only when the site has had a valid certificate from here before. A site that has never validated is noted as info: usually a name not used over HTTPS (CDN hostnames for plain-HTTP downloads) or a service with its own private CA (Microsoft Update, Signal). If such a site's issuer then changes, that is still high.

    The system log gets medium and high findings only (and their "Resolved" lines); info stays on the page and in astraea findings.

  3. Checks CAA: a domain's DNS CAA record lists the CAs allowed to issue for it. CAs check it when they issue; Astraea checks it afterwards, for publicly trusted certificates, through the router's own resolver (no third party). Issuers it cannot map to CAA names are not judged, and since a record can change after issuance, a mismatch is medium. Whether your resolver validated the answer with DNSSEC is noted, and the page and astraea status say whether your resolver validates DNSSEC at all (one test query an hour). The same tool checks DANE (TLSA records at _443._tcp.<site>), where a domain pins its key in DNS, for domains whose DNS is DNSSEC-signed (an unsigned TLSA record can be forged or removed by whoever can forge the site's address, so it protects nothing). Needs Entware's drill (or dig), installed automatically; without it CAA and DANE checks are off.

  4. Remembers who issues each site's certificates, valid or not, on USB, so a change is caught even across a reboot. Renewals and rotation between a CA's own intermediates are normal and not flagged; only a different issuing organization or root is. A clean issuer change is accepted automatically and noted as info for a week: the new certificate is publicly trusted and CT-logged, its CAA allows the CA (or there is none), and the site is in a network it already uses or independent resolvers confirm where it is. That is what a CDN changing CA looks like; interception (a private root, an antivirus or ISP proxy) is not publicly trusted or not CT-logged, and still alerts. Any other issuer change stays open until you accept it with astraea ack <site>, also across reboots. Accepted issuers are added, not replaced (up to 4 per site), so a site that alternates between CAs is not flagged again. Each site's recent keys (4) and networks (8, coarse: IPv4 /16, IPv6 /32) are remembered too. A new key alone is a normal renewal, and a new address alone is a CDN moving; only when they change together with the CA, or with a brand-new certificate, is it looked at.

  5. Flags devices whose clocks are too wrong to check certificates safely, from Kairos's client monitor: a clock behind accepts certificates after they expire, a clock ahead rejects new ones, and a device keeping local time judges dates hours off. For a clock days off, it shows the date the device thinks it is and how many of the certificates checked recently would look invalid to it.

  6. Lists devices it cannot vouch for: devices Kairos saw using the router's time whose lookups never reached your resolver (their own DNS settings, DNS-over-TLS, a VPN). Matched by MAC, so a device using IPv6 for DNS still counts; listed after an hour of watching the DNS log.

  7. Watches the router's own trusted roots for additions and removals when the CA bundle updates.

  8. Emails you confirmed high findings (optional, through amtm's email settings): only high findings, the shape of a hijack or of interception, and only when a second check at least a minute later still finds them. Medium and info are never emailed. One email names each site and its findings, never your devices; at most one email in 10 minutes. Turn it on under Updates & Alerts on the page (with a test button) or in astraea config.

  9. Keeps a record of the add-on scripts on the router: the page's Add-ons section lists each script in /jffs/scripts and /jffs/addons with its version and SHA-256. Every change is kept (the last 20 per add-on, on JFFS) and logged: a new version, the same version with a different file, a script removed or installed again. Kairos, Astraea and Homonoia are also checked against their release signature. For an add-on whose author does not sign, a change is a fact to compare with the author's release notes, not a verdict. The files are hashed again every 10 minutes, so a file swapped for one of the same size and date is still caught. Names come from amtm's own list of the add-ons it installs (read from the router's amtm, so new ones are named too), which also covers the ones amtm keeps elsewhere (Diversion in /opt/bin, ModSyslogUI, installers, amtm itself). Add-ons whose authors sign their releases are checked too: the key is remembered the first time and a different key later is a warning (see SIGNING.md). Add-ons that update from a repository (GitHub, Codeberg and the like) are listed first, with where they update from, plus AdGuard Home's program, which updates itself from AdGuard; scripts with none (your own) sit in a fold, and their changes are kept but not logged. The title bar shows whether amtm updates add-ons automatically (amtm, then au) and can switch it: off means nothing changes until you update it yourself, so any change the section shows is one you made. Turning it on again restores amtm's schedule (Sunday at 23:45 unless one was set).

Data

Where What
JFFS /jffs/addons/astraea.d (root only, 700) settings, AdGuard Home login or Pi-hole password (600), what uninstall puts back (600), web page
USB /opt/var/lib/astraea baseline (site, accepted issuers and roots, first/last seen, expiry, ever valid, recent keys and networks) and open findings; written at most every 10 minutes and only on change; at most 5000 sites, sites unseen for 30 days dropped
RAM /tmp/astraea everything else

Privacy

By default, no site names leave the router. Astraea reads the names your devices looked up from your own resolver and connects to those sites itself to see their certificates. Your normal browsing is never sent anywhere. Two optional checks can send the name of one flagged site out; both are off by default, and you choose them on the page or with astraea config:

Certificate Transparency lookups (CT_LOOKUP, off by default): for the findings you pick (high; medium and high; or all, info included), the site's name is sent to crt.sh (run by Sectigo) and Cert Spotter (run by SSLMate), to ask whether its certificate is in the public CT logs. Both are asked for now, side by side: crt.sh by the certificate's serial number, Cert Spotter by the site's name (a few pages at most; it allows a few unauthenticated lookups an hour). A service that does not answer shows as busy and is asked again the next day. Each site is looked up at most once a day.

The DNS cross-check (XC1, XC2, off by default): when a site changes issuer from a network it never used, or shows the shape of a hijack (above), its name, and only that name, is asked of two independent resolvers over HTTPS (DoH), at fixed addresses, so DNS blocklists that block DoH names (HaGeZi and others) do not disable it. You pick the two:

Choice Resolver Address
cloudflare Cloudflare 1.1.1.1
google Google Public DNS 8.8.8.8
quad9 Quad9, unfiltered (no malware blocking) 9.9.9.10
adguard AdGuard DNS, non-filtering 94.140.14.140
controld Control D, unfiltered 76.76.2.0

All are public and do not filter, so their answers are the site's real ones. If one of them is also your router's own upstream, the page and astraea status warn: it is not a second opinion then, so pick another (when you turn it on, Astraea suggests a second one that is not).

With the cross-check off, a site that changes CA in a network it never used, with a certificate that is publicly trusted, CT-logged and allowed by the site's CAA, is raised as medium (never emailed): without a second opinion, a CDN changing CA and a hijack with a mis-issued certificate look the same. Certificates that are not publicly trusted, not CT-logged, self-signed or not allowed by the site's CAA are still high: those need no second opinion, and they are what nearly every hijack has to use. A certificate made out for another name is medium (devices refuse it, so nothing can be read through it), and high when it comes from a network the site never used and the cross-check does not confirm it. A change from the site's usual CA in a new network is not raised without the cross-check.

Apart from these two, Astraea contacts only the sites your devices visited (for their certificates), the update hosts it watches (codeberg.org and the others under "update channels"), the NTS servers Kairos uses (their key exchange on port 4460), Codeberg for its own updates, and your own mail server for alerts. None of these carries anyone's browsing. Reading AdGuard Home or Pi-hole on another LAN box stays on your LAN.

The diagnostic report (astraea report, or Make report on the page) is made on the router and goes nowhere by itself: device names, addresses, email addresses, the router's name and site names are left out, so it can be pasted when asking for help. Read it before posting.

When the independent resolvers point elsewhere, the router also fetches the site's certificate there: the same key means answers just vary by location; the same CA with the same set of names (two or more) means another edge of the same CDN (a hijacker can only get a certificate for names whose DNS it controls, never the same multi-name set); the site's usual issuer with another key means your resolver's answer leads somewhere the site is not.

Install

Requires Kairos 0.9.38 or later (the current Kairos is recommended: handling of access points, bridges and Kairos exemptions needs 0.9.60 or later), installed from its signed release, with its NTP intercept on and the clock already synced over NTS. Also Entware; openssl-util, jq, ca-bundle and drill are installed automatically.

curl -fsSL https://codeberg.org/Synastry/Astraea/raw/branch/main/astraea.sh -o /jffs/scripts/astraea.sh
curl -fsSL https://codeberg.org/Synastry/Astraea/raw/branch/main/astraea.sh.sig -o /jffs/scripts/astraea.sh.sig
chmod 755 /jffs/scripts/astraea.sh
/jffs/scripts/astraea.sh install

The installer checks its own signature first and stops, changing nothing, if astraea.sh.sig is missing or does not match: download both files from the same release. With AdGuard Home or Pi-hole, install asks for its login (to read the query log). Install then sets up the DNS path, asking before each step.

The DNS path

Astraea checks the certificates of the names your devices look up. A poisoned resolver is caught either way: Astraea fetches the certificate from wherever the answer points and checks it against trusted time, the CA bundle, CT and CAA, so the resolver is never trusted. What the DNS path decides is coverage: with every LAN device's lookups going through this router's resolver, Astraea checks exactly what each device was given. A device using its own DNS could be sent to a fake site without Astraea seeing it. Astraea sets the path up and owns those decisions; Kairos runs the firewall rules (one rule engine, one list of exempt devices). Install asks before each step and records what it changes; a "no" means partial coverage, said plainly:

  1. AdGuard Home or Pi-hole on another LAN box (where DNS Director sends LAN DNS, a keepalived address included, or a LAN DNS server that DHCP hands out or devices are seen using; not one the router only forwards to, which never sees your devices): install finds it, asks "Read site names from it?" and the login (AdGuard Home: its web login; Pi-hole: its password or an app password), and checks that it works. Then DNS Director stays as it is: Astraea reads that resolver's log, so coverage is full. With keepalived, give the backup box the same login. A login that does not work changes nothing. An existing install is offered the same with astraea config.
  2. DNS Director sending LAN DNS elsewhere (an outside server, or a LAN server Astraea cannot read): it offers to switch DNS Director's global mode to Router. Per-device settings stay.
  3. DNS servers on your LAN (a Pi-hole on another box): exempted, so their own lookups are not redirected back to the router.
  4. The DNS intercept (through Kairos): DNS that devices aim at outside servers goes to your resolver instead. Every lookup still gets an answer. DNS Director, VPN Director's Exclusive DNS, devices you exempt and devices set to "No filtering" in DNS Director keep priority, and if the resolver stops listening, DNS passes untouched (fail-open) until it is back.
  5. From then on kairos config shows the DNS settings as managed by Astraea.

Optional, on the page or with astraea dns dot|doh on|off: blocking DNS-over-TLS, and DNS-over-HTTPS to the major public resolvers. On Reaper this is Reaper's own block (Bastion > Encrypted DNS), one switch for both, as Reaper's guide asks of add-ons; Astraea also uses the firmware's own root bundle there. Phones set to a fixed Private DNS provider then need Automatic mode or an exemption (Kairos README: Phones and Private DNS).

Before and after blocking: who uses encrypted DNS. With Kairos 0.9.44 or later, the page lists every LAN device that used DNS-over-TLS, or DNS-over-HTTPS to one of the major public resolvers, in the last 7 days, whether or not a block is on (Kairos records them in kernel RAM), plus devices that looked up a DoH server's name (from your resolver's log). For each it shows what the blocks do, per method: for example DoT refused · DoH passes, or allowed. Allow lets one device keep its own encrypted DNS when the blocks are on (it is added to Kairos's DNS_BLOCK_ALLOW, by MAC when known); Remove takes it off again. On the command line: astraea dns seen, astraea dns allow add|del <device> and astraea dns forget <ip>. DoH to a server that is not on the list looks like any other HTTPS and cannot be seen without breaking open TLS.

What is not covered, and is shown as such: devices using their own VPN or encrypted DNS to a server not on the list (their DNS never reaches the router; nothing short of breaking open TLS could see it), devices you exempt, and devices routed through VPN Director with Exclusive DNS. Without the intercept (turned down at install, or off later) Astraea keeps checking the lookups that reach this router, and the page, astraea status and the log say "partial coverage": "no findings" then does not speak for devices that use their own DNS. astraea uninstall puts every DNS setting back as it was. An existing install sets the DNS path up with astraea dns setup.

Commands

astraea status              overview
astraea findings            open findings, high first
astraea certs [n]           recently checked certificates
astraea devices [--names]   device clocks too wrong to check certificates; devices not covered
astraea addons [trust <n> | entware]  add-ons, versions and signatures; trust an author's new key; Entware packages
astraea check <site>        check one site now and show its certificate
astraea ack <site>          add a site's current issuer to its accepted issuers, close its findings
astraea ack all             the same for every open issuer change
astraea ack <site> misconfig  the site's own misconfiguration is known: quiet until its certificate changes
astraea ack router          close the findings about the router's trusted root list
astraea ack misconfig [info]  every site's own misconfiguration at once (mediums; info too with 'info')
astraea config              where site names come from (AdGuard Home, Pi-hole, dnsmasq), CT lookups,
                            DNS cross-check, email alerts
astraea report              diagnostic report to paste when asking for help (no names or addresses)
astraea start | stop | restart
astraea update [check|force] | verifyfile [file] [sig]
astraea fingerprint         the release key this copy trusts (compare with the published one)
astraea pin [accept]        the certificate key recorded for a resolver reached over HTTPS
astraea uninstall [-y]

The page is under Addons > Astraea. Besides the overview it has:

  • Findings with a search box, a severity filter, Ack buttons in their own column ("Ack all issuer changes" and "Ack all misconfigurations" when there are several it can ack; a site whose certificate is not in memory keeps its own Ack, which checks it fresh), and export as CSV or JSON (device names only when they are shown).
  • Recently Checked certificates (the newest 300 checks) with a search box, "Search all" (everything checked in about a week, searched on the router only when you click it) and export.
  • A site card: click a site to see what Astraea knows about it now (usual issuer and root, networks, key, the last check, open findings, acks). It is read from the files Astraea already keeps, only when you click; nothing extra is stored.
  • A collapse toggle at the right of each section header; your browser remembers which are collapsed.
  • Settings for DoT/DoH blocks, email alerts, the cross-check and CT lookups, update checks, a test email and a diagnostic report.

Every change goes through the firmware's own add-on settings path (the request is saved in /jffs/addons/custom_settings.txt, a service event runs astraea.sh, which acts and removes it), asks for confirmation where it matters, and is logged.

What Astraea cannot see

Said up front, so nobody reads "no findings" as more than it is.

  • An interception next to the server. If a site's hosting provider or its own network swaps the certificate, every network in the world is served the same thing. Astraea sees only a change of key or CA from this router's own history, and a valid new certificate from the site's usual CA looks like a renewal.
  • A valid certificate from another CA at the site's usual address. A publicly trusted, CT-logged certificate from a different CA, in the network the site always used, is what a site changing CA looks like. Astraea accepts it quietly (info for a week). Someone on the path who holds a mis-issued certificate looks the same. The site's CAA record is the defence, where the site publishes one.
  • Devices that do not use the router's DNS. Their own encrypted DNS, a VPN, or a hard-coded resolver the intercept cannot redirect. Astraea lists the devices it cannot vouch for; it cannot see where they go.
  • A different answer for the router than for a device. Astraea makes its own connection to the site. It does not sit inside a device's connection, so an attacker who can tell the two apart could show the router the real certificate.
  • Anything in time. A finding comes when the router checks, not before a device connects. Astraea detects and tells; it never blocks.

Limits

  • With dnsmasq's query log as the source, a site answered through an alias (CNAME) is checked at the router's own lookup, not at the address a device was given: the log does not say which address belongs to which alias. AdGuard Home and Pi-hole report each site's address exactly.
  • The router checks the certificate it is served. With TLS 1.3 it cannot see the certificate each device received, and CDNs may serve different certificates in different places: a finding is a lead, not proof.
  • Only HTTPS on port 443 is checked. QUIC/HTTP-3, other ports and pinned apps are not.
  • Revocation (OCSP/CRL) is not checked.
  • On a router that is not in router mode (access point, repeater, media bridge, AiMesh node), devices' DNS goes to the main router, so only lookups made through this router itself are checked. Install Astraea on the main router for full coverage.

Intel for other tools

astraea intel <name|address> tells another tool (IOCMON, for one) what Astraea knows, so it can confirm or clear its own alert. It uses only what Astraea already checked: nothing is looked up, nothing leaves the router.

abeptfl1xyz.vod-dash.main.amazon.pv-cdn.net|52.84.1.1|valid|Amazon|1|20|-|-
domain|pv-cdn.net|names=6|valid_ct=6|findings=0|oldest_days=20|issuers=Amazon
self|asked by the router for Astraea (TLSA), 0 min ago
verdict|clear|abeptfl1xyz.vod-dash.main.amazon.pv-cdn.net has a valid CT-logged Amazon certificate, known 20 days

Site lines are name|address|verdict|issuer|ct|days_known|finding|devices (verdict: valid, invalid:<reason> for a site that was valid before, never-valid:<reason>, notls, other-name, private-ca). The domain line profiles the whole domain, which matters for random-looking names: a domain where 5 or more names all have valid, CT-logged certificates, known for a week, is a CDN, not a DNS tunnel (tunnel names almost never serve HTTPS). A self line means the router asked for that name itself, for Astraea's own checks. The last line and the exit code give the verdict:

  • confirm (exit 1): an open high or medium finding, or a site that was valid before fails its check.
  • clear (exit 0): a valid, CT-logged certificate known for 7+ days with no open finding, or the domain profile above.
  • contained (exit 3): your resolver blocked the name. AdGuard Home answers a blocked name itself and never forwards the query, so nothing reached the outside, not even data hidden in the name (how DNS tunnels work). A blocked line gives the blocklist and rule, the number of queries in the last day and the devices asking.
  • unknown (exit 2): anything else, including names Astraea has not checked.

Blocked names come from AdGuard Home's query log (labelled AdGuard Home blocklist, custom rule or blocked service) or dnsmasq's (Diversion blocklist, dnsmasq rule); Pi-hole and others follow. Long rules are shortened. Astraea reads the log about once a minute, so a name blocked seconds ago can still be unknown: ask again a minute later.

The same site lines for everything checked recently are in /tmp/astraea/intel.tsv (RAM), refreshed every cycle, and the names the router asked for Astraea in the last two hours are in /tmp/astraea/selfq (name|type|time). astraea intel also reads Kairos 0.9.41's /tmp/kairos/selfq (the probe name, update hosts and the NTS servers chrony uses), so a self| line says which add-on the router asked for.

The router's own lookups (selfq)

Astraea checks a site by connecting to it from the router, so the router looks the name up too. Tools that watch DNS (IOCMON, for one) can tell those lookups apart from a device's with selfq:

  • selfq says who asked, never whether a name is safe. Every lookup Astraea itself makes is recorded whatever the result: a malware domain whose certificate verified and one whose check failed both end up there. It must never be used as an allowlist.
  • A device's query is never hidden. Astraea only checks names a LAN device already looked up, so the device's own query is already in the log from the device's address. A selfq match can only explain the router's second copy of it.
  • Blocked names are skipped. Astraea never looks up a name your resolver blocked.
  • No race. The line is written just before the lookup (before connecting, before the CAA or TLSA query), not after anything is validated, so it is there by the time the router's query reaches the DNS log.
  • Match on the name, from the router's own addresses, within about a minute. Match the name only, not the type: one check asks for A and AAAA (AdGuard Home may also log HTTPS) while selfq usually records A. Names are lowercase, without the trailing dot; TLSA lookups appear as _443._tcp.<site>. If a router query has no match yet, look once more a few seconds later (log buffering).
  • Both files are read-only for other tools, in RAM, and keep the last two hours. Missing or empty means the add-on is not installed or has not looked anything up yet.

For Astraea's opinion of a name, use astraea intel (above), not selfq. A valid certificate alone never makes a name clear.

Questions people ask

What is a certificate, and why does my router care?

When a device opens https://yourbank.com, the site proves who it is with a certificate: a signed statement from a certificate authority (CA) saying "this key belongs to yourbank.com, from this date to that date". Your devices check it themselves. Astraea checks the same certificates from the router, remembers who issues them, and notices when that changes in a way that looks like interception rather than normal housekeeping.

Why does the time matter?

Every certificate is valid only between two dates. A clock that is wrong accepts certificates that have expired or rejects new ones, and an attacker who can move your clock can make an old, leaked certificate look valid again. Astraea judges nothing until Kairos reports time it got over NTS (authenticated time), and it flags devices whose clocks are too far off.

A site was flagged. Is something wrong?

Usually not. Most findings are sites changing their setup: moving to another CDN, switching CAs, or a misconfiguration on their side (an expired certificate, a CAA record that does not match). Hover the ⓘ for the details. High means "this looks like interception": take it seriously. Medium means "unusual, worth a look". Info is for the curious and never reaches the system log.

A site is flagged for its own mistake (CAA, an expired or incomplete certificate). Can I make it stop?

Yes: its Ack button (or astraea ack <site> misconfig). That says "I know about this one" for the exact certificate the site serves now. If the site changes its certificate, the finding comes back and is judged again. High findings, the ones that look like interception, can never be silenced this way.

What do I do about an issuer change?

If the site is one you trust and the change makes sense (it moved to another provider), press Ack (or astraea ack <site>): the new issuer is remembered and it is not flagged again. If you did not expect it, especially on a bank or email site, do not log in there from this network until you know why.

What is CT (Certificate Transparency)?

Every publicly trusted certificate must be written into public, append-only logs, so anyone can see every certificate issued for a name. A certificate that is not logged is not trusted by browsers; one that is logged but that nobody expected shows up for the site's owner to see.

What is CAA?

A DNS record where a domain lists the CAs allowed to issue its certificates. CAs must check it before issuing. A certificate from a CA the record does not allow was issued against the domain's wishes, or the record changed afterwards: medium, worth a look.

What are DNSSEC and DANE, and should I turn DNSSEC on?

DNSSEC signs DNS answers so they cannot be forged on the way. DANE uses a signed DNS record to pin a site's key. Astraea checks DANE only when your resolver validates DNSSEC. Few websites publish DANE records, so little is lost without it. To turn it on: with dnsmasq, WAN > Internet Connection > Enable DNSSEC support; with AdGuard Home, Settings > DNS settings > DNSSEC, with an upstream that validates (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9 and most public resolvers do).

What is the DNS cross-check, and should I turn it on?

It is off by default. When on, and a site suddenly shows up somewhere it has never been, Astraea asks two outside resolvers where it really is, as a second opinion that your own DNS cannot influence. Only that one name is sent, only then. It turns those changes from medium into either a confirmed high or an accepted move. Turn it on if that second opinion is worth sending those names out; pick two resolvers that are not your router's upstream (the page warns if one is).

Why does a device show up under Encrypted DNS?

It uses its own encrypted DNS (DNS-over-TLS, or DNS-over-HTTPS) instead of your router's, so Astraea cannot see what it looks up. Browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox "secure DNS"), Android's Private DNS and some apps do this. With the blocks on, they fall back to your resolver; a device that must keep its own (medical equipment, a work laptop) can be allowed with one click.

Does Astraea read my traffic or send my browsing anywhere?

No. It reads only the names your devices looked up (from your own resolver's log) and connects to those sites itself to see their certificates. Nothing is decrypted, and nothing leaves the router except the optional lookups described under Privacy, for flagged sites only.

Will it slow my router? Does it wear out my USB stick?

It is built for older routers too (it runs in the lab on an RT-AC68U). It checks at most one site every 2 seconds, each site again after 24 hours (the update hosts and NTS servers hourly), and does nothing in between. The USB stick is written at most every 10 minutes, and only when something changed; everything else stays in RAM.

How do I remove it?

astraea uninstall. It puts every DNS setting it changed back as it was (in Kairos too), removes its page, settings and saved data, and leaves Kairos installed.

Changes

  • 0.4.8: Spare release key (kept offline) accepted for updates; astraea fingerprint shows both. New fold in Add-ons: Entware's packages and their versions, the ones Kairos and Astraea rely on (chrony, OpenSSL, curl, the root certificate bundle) listed first. Entware's packages are not signed, so every version change is logged and emailed with "Add-on changes" (astraea addons entware lists them). A certificate for another name is one finding, not two (the second wrongly said "not publicly trusted"), and medium instead of high: devices refuse it, so nothing can be read through it. It stays high when it comes from an address in a network the site never used that independent resolvers do not confirm (reported by Radon_82). A script in an add-on's own folder is listed with that add-on ("ModSyslogUI: preset_manager.sh") instead of as a local script (reported by JB_1366). Third known author key: Auto SSH-Key by JB_1366 (the key in his README and script). synastry.oklnd.com is checked every hour with the other update hosts. Firewall calls that collide with another add-on's are tried again (as Kairos 1.0.0). Text from the page that Astraea ignores is filtered before it is logged. An author's signature written inside the script itself (RSA, with the keys in the script) is checked too. No false BAD signature warning when an add-on and its signature are replaced a moment apart. Coverage names devices with a fixed address and lists each device once. New companion doc: The Problem.

  • 0.4.7: An author's key no longer reads "not readable" on routers without sha256sum (RT-AX88U and others of that generation): the key is fingerprinted with OpenSSL instead.

Older releases
  • 0.4.6: Second known author key: Wireless Report by JB_1366 (the key published in his script and README).

  • 0.4.5: An add-on's history shows its newest 5 changes, with "show all" for the rest. First key in the known author list: Wireless Report SSH by JB_1366 (fingerprint from his repository). Not in router mode (a bridge or access point), the DNS path and Partial coverage lines are grey instead of red and yellow, and the DoT/DoH boxes are hidden: the main router decides where DNS goes.

  • 0.4.4: Add-ons are named the way amtm names them, from amtm's own list (Skynet, not "firewall"; Skynet was always there, as its file name), and the ones amtm keeps outside /jffs/scripts are listed too: Diversion, ModSyslogUI, the AdGuard Home and dnscrypt installers, and amtm itself. Signature and key files are no longer listed as local scripts. Where an add-on updates from is the address amtm itself downloads it from (TAILMON showed a library it links to, ModSyslogUI a firmware link); for others, the address the script downloads from most. Other authors' signatures: when an add-on ships a signature and its author's public key (see SIGNING.md), Astraea checks it, remembers the key the first time (as SSH does) and warns loudly if a later update is signed with another key; accept a real new key with astraea addons trust <name> or the page's "trust" link. Changes that check out end with "(signed)" in the log and email. New astraea addons lists them all.

  • 0.4.3: The email footer no longer tells you to untick "high findings" to stop an add-on email: it points to the "Email me" boxes. AdGuard Home's version includes its build (v1.0.0-a.117+3400b879), as amtm shows it.

  • 0.4.2: Add-on versions are read more strictly: Skynet (firewall) showed "0", a setting such as verbose="0" taken for a version. A version now needs a dot, comes from a variable named like a version (SCRIPT_VERSION, localver; not SERVER or DRIVER) or a header line ("# Version: 2.0.8", "- v8.0.6"). Homonoia uses the same rules.

  • 0.4.1: The page no longer reloads after a setting or a button: it is sent in the background, and what you chose stays on screen ("saving...") until the router has applied it. On slower routers (RT-AC68U) a dropdown or checkbox used to jump back to the old value until a second try.

  • 0.4.0 (Friends in the Industry): New Add-ons section near the top of the page: each add-on that updates from a repository, with its version, SHA-256, where it updates from and, for Kairos, Astraea and Homonoia, its release signature check, plus a history of every change, kept on JFFS. AdGuard Home's program has a row of its own. A change is logged, and can be emailed ("Add-on changes", next to "High findings"): changes within 10 minutes come as one email, and after two emails in an hour the next waits an hour. Your own scripts are folded and not logged. The section's title bar shows amtm's automatic add-on updates and can turn them off or on, the way amtm's own menu does. astraea status sums the add-ons up in one line. "Updates & Alerts" moved above Coverage. "Release key" on the page is now "Key". The email alerts question at astraea config recommends yes. Works on firmware whose shell has no command (RT-AC68U).

  • 0.3.9: dnsmasq's query log moves to Astraea's own log in RAM (/etc), off the system log: no flash writes, and no lost lookups where the system log drops info lines (Reaper). Existing installs move over once; Diversion's log is left alone. If dnsmasq fails to start because of Astraea's lines, Astraea takes them out and restarts it. Install checks that a test lookup arrives. Reaper: its own DoT/DoH block and the firmware's root certificates are used. Coverage says whether the roots match those accepted in Kairos. "Resolved" log lines say why. Brief outages (AdGuard Home restarting, trusted time missing for seconds) are logged only if they last. The Entware server is named, and mirrors marked.

  • 0.3.8: No high alert when a site that has never had a valid certificate from your router changes issuer to another certificate that is not valid either. Seen in the field on WhatsApp's chat servers, which answer a certificate check with throwaway certificates under random names: each new one raised a high alert by email. It is now a note on the page. A site that had a valid certificate before still raises high. After the update, an open alert of this kind is looked at again and closed.

  • 0.3.7: A "new network" notice no longer stays open after it has stopped applying. It was closed only when the site was next checked and looked ordinary, so it stayed for a service that keeps showing new servers, and for a site no device visited again. Now a check that finds the same situation harmless closes the earlier notice too, and an open notice is looked at again once a day by itself.

  • 0.3.6: Fewer false alarms for services that use a certificate per server. "Your resolver sends devices to a network this site has not used before, where a certificate with a new key answers" is no longer raised when the certificate that answers where independent resolvers point comes from the same CA and names the same organisation: the CA checked who asked both times (seen in the field on a large provider's own service, a day after a new certificate went out on new servers). A domain-validated certificate names no organisation, so a name hijacked with one is still reported. README: what the release signature covers and what it does not.

  • 0.3.5: Astraea checks its installed copy against its release signature when the daemon starts and every hour after that, as Kairos and Homonoia do (until now it verified only what it installed or updated). The result is in status, the report and on the page; a mismatch is logged as a warning. The fingerprint of the release key this copy trusts is shown at the top of the page and by astraea fingerprint; compare it with the one published outside the repository. A resolver reached over HTTPS (a Pi-hole on another box, or AdGuard Home with its own TLS) now has its certificate pinned: the key is recorded the first time that address is used, and a different key stops the reads until you accept it with astraea pin accept. Until now those calls did not check the certificate at all, because it is almost always self-signed. The default setup (AdGuard Home at http://127.0.0.1) has no TLS and is unchanged.

  • 0.3.4: Command-line output fits the terminal it is printed on. On a narrow screen (SSH from a phone) status, findings, certs, devices, check, dns and the help are wrapped at words, with what follows hanging under the text it belongs to, and certs prints each certificate on two lines. The texts of install and config wrap the same way (their questions are left as they are). Output sent to a file or a pipe is unchanged, and report is never wrapped (it is made to be pasted).

  • 0.3.3: A CAA mismatch is a note (info), not a medium, when the certificate was issued more than 30 days ago by the site's usual issuer in its usual network. CAs check CAA only when they issue, so on an older certificate the usual cause is a record the site changed afterwards (seen on two well-known sites in the first days of the beta). A certificate issued in the last 30 days, a new issuer or a new network keeps medium. What this gives up: a mis-issued certificate held for more than a month reads as a note on a site this router has not seen before. Ack on the page: the button could come back with the finding still open, so the ack looked lost and was pressed twice. The page took the daemon's routine refresh for the result while the ack was still being applied. It now waits for the ack's own result.

  • 0.3.2: VPN Director rules that keep a network on the WAN were listed under "By your choice" as sending their DNS through the VPN. They do the opposite (the firmware leaves that network's DNS alone) and are no longer listed. When Entware cannot install a package Astraea needs, the installer shows what opkg said (a mirror missing a file, for example) in place of only "missing". The diagnostic report keeps the router's model when the router is named after it.

  • 0.3.1: Fixed false highs on routers that read dnsmasq's query log (no AdGuard Home or Pi-hole): a site answered through an alias (CNAME) could be given another site's address from the log and was then checked there, which looked like a hijack (wrong name, another CA, a new network) and could send an email. An aliased site is now checked at the router's own lookup, through the same resolver; a site whose address is on its own log line is still checked at exactly that address. If you have such findings (the site card shows an address that is plainly not the site's), Ack them: they will not come back.

  • 0.3.0: Public beta. The same as 0.2.19, plus a note on the findings export: it lists site names and device addresses, so it is for your own use (share the diagnostic report instead).

  • 0.2.19: A CAA record that independent resolvers see and your resolver does not is a note first and a finding only when it is still missing 3 hours later (a resolver cache gave a false medium after a site added its record). A chain ending in a root that is not publicly trusted is called a private CA, not self-signed. Not in router mode: Partial coverage says only lookups made through this router are checked, in place of advice that cannot work there. Diagnostic report: a Clear button, and base rates (how many findings were raised by severity and kind, over how many days and sites; counts only). New README section: What Astraea cannot see. With Homonoia: its new answers (another CA no witness backs; a router on this network, not counted) are worded, and a router on this network no longer holds back an email.

  • 0.2.18: Ack works in the background: no page reload, one press. A DANE record that pins another key while the site serves a valid, CT-logged certificate with its usual key is a medium (a stale record), ackable. Kairos's NTS servers are checked every hour like the update hosts (TLS on port 4460). Coverage: devices exempted in Kairos are listed under By your choice, and a device listed there is no longer also Not covered. The Kairos DNS intercept counts only in router mode. Clearer time note when chronyd's command socket is missing. Report: no empty snapshot error, no "Last action" showing the report itself.

  • 0.2.17: Page sections renamed and reordered (Overview, Coverage, Encrypted Clients, Wrong Clock(s), Updates & Alerts, Findings, Recently Checked), each with a collapse toggle (remembered in your browser). New: Search all in Recently Checked (the list keeps the newest 300 checks; Search all looks through the last week on the router, only when clicked). "Accepted automatically" notes say no action is needed and when they clear. An ack from the command line shows on the page at once. The site card's "Seen" row is now "Usual issuer seen". Fixed: the site card closed by itself (its request now goes in the background, without a page reload); Ack all misconfigurations offered sites it could not ack (it now counts only those it can); "expired" named the server's own date when another certificate in its chain had expired; uneven spacing between sections.

  • 0.2.16:

    • Fixed: stopping and starting Astraea quickly (for example acking site after site in a loop) could leave many daemons running at once. Only one daemon runs now, astraea stop ends any extra ones, and astraea status warns if there is more than one.
    • astraea ack misconfig acks every site's own misconfiguration in one pass (mediums; add info for info too). The page has a matching "Ack all misconfigurations" button.
    • Page: search and severity filter for findings, search for certificates, export as CSV or JSON, Ack in its own column, and a site card (click a site) with what Astraea knows about it.
    • Shorter CAA wording; the full list of allowed issuers is in the tooltip.
  • 0.2.15:

    • A CA bundle update that comes with Entware (ca-bundle package) is one info line, not a medium per new root. Roots that appear without an Entware update stay medium per root.
    • The router's root findings can be acknowledged: Ack on the page, or astraea ack router.
  • 0.2.14:

    • Finds AdGuard Home that asks for a login (it answered with 401 and was skipped).
    • When no AdGuard Home or Pi-hole is found, astraea config says what it checked and why.
    • Clears the firmware's LD_LIBRARY_PATH at start, so Entware programs (jq, dig, drill) run from cron load their own libraries.
  • 0.2.13: Fixed: a misconfiguration Ack did nothing when the site's certificate was no longer in RAM (after a reboot, or a week unchecked). Self-signed info findings (never valid from here) can be acknowledged; high ones still cannot.

  • 0.2.12:

    • Finds AdGuard Home or Pi-hole (6+) on another LAN box at install (or astraea config) and reads its log with one yes and the login. Keepalived works; DNS Director stays as it is.
    • Fixed: a LAN DNS server's exemption was not recorded on a fresh install, so uninstall left it. If you installed 0.2.11 with one, remove it by hand at uninstall: kairos exempt del <address>.
    • Settings folder is root only (700), logins and restore file 600.
    • Page: a Coverage section (site names source, not covered, devices skipping your resolver by your own settings) and Make report (diagnostic report, nothing personal in it).
    • "Not covered" says it is counted after an hour instead of showing 0.
    • Test email: the page tells "never started" from "started, no result", and the log records it.
    • An issuer finding whose usual certificate answers again stays open until ack, saying so, and is not emailed.
    • CT lookups: crt.sh by serial number, Cert Spotter reads past its first page; no answer shows as busy.
  • 0.2.11: The DNS cross-check is off by default, so by default no site names leave the router (routers that already have it set keep their choice). Without it, a CA change in a new network with a publicly trusted, CT-logged, CAA-allowed certificate is medium (never emailed), not high; untrusted, unlogged, wrong-name, self-signed or CAA-forbidden certificates stay high. Turning it on (page or astraea config) suggests a second resolver that is not your upstream.

  • 0.2.10: Built for the firmware's nvram hang (a known bug that can leave nvram calls stuck forever): Astraea's nvram and cru calls end after 5 seconds and fall back to the last value read, the 10-minute job never runs twice at once and no longer rewrites the crontab when its line is there, and the clock check reads Kairos's state from /tmp/kairos/status (Kairos 0.9.57) instead of nvram.

  • 0.2.9: Email alerts come about a minute after the first bad check (the second check runs on the next cycle, not 5 minutes later), list each site once with all its findings, and name the router by its hostname. Update channels are checked at the router's own lookup (the router downloads from them), not at an address a device was given hours ago. When a known site changes issuer and your resolver says it has no CAA, the independent resolvers are asked too: if they see a record, theirs counts, and the hidden record is a medium finding (a hijacking resolver can answer every record type). A site served by more than one CDN is judged again when its usual issuer answers: when its CAA allows both CAs, the medium becomes info. With Homonoia installed, another router's answer holds an email back only when it is newer than the finding; without it, the page and settings no longer mention it.

  • 0.2.8: Update channels: the hosts router add-ons, amtm and Entware update from (codeberg.org, raw.githubusercontent.com, github.com, diversion.ch, bin.entware.net, your Entware feeds, plus UPDATE_HOSTS) are checked every hour whether or not a device visited them, and a finding there says it is an update channel. The page and status say when Entware fetches packages over plain HTTP, with the fix.

  • 0.2.7: A new "Updates and alerts" section on the page: check for and install updates (signed, the same as astraea update), and opt-in email alerts through amtm's email settings, with a test button. Only confirmed high findings are emailed: the shape of a hijack or of interception, still high at a second check at least 5 minutes later, and not contradicted by a Homonoia witness. Medium and info are never emailed. Names the site and the finding, never your devices. Emails are standard and marked automatic (fewer land in spam). The page shows your address masked. Also in astraea config and astraea status. The README documents the router's own lookups (selfq) for tools that watch DNS.

  • 0.2.6: A site served by more than one CDN (a valid, CT-logged certificate from another CA here, the usual one where independent resolvers point) is accepted and noted as info when the site's CAA, read through the independent resolvers, allows both CAs. Without CAA it stays medium: to one router a CDN split and a local hijack with a mis-issued certificate then look the same. A fresh install picks cross-check resolvers that are not the router's own upstream. Status reads the uncovered-devices count the daemon already keeps.

  • 0.2.5: Works without a DNS intercept: Astraea checks the lookups that reach this router and says "partial coverage" instead of pausing. Install offers to turn on dnsmasq query logging on routers without AdGuard Home (uninstall removes it). The page says when AdGuard Home's login is missing or rejected, shows "Checking the first sites" right after install, and counts what "no findings" covers. A failed install says what to do next. Several Astraea commands at once (the daemon, status, the page) can no longer make a table grow without end: no command rewrites a file in place any more, and an oversized site-to-device table is cut back when the daemon starts.

  • 0.2.4: The witness note covers Homonoia's newer verdicts (nolocal, and the DNS side: cdn, blocked, differs); a DNS "differs" from a witness now marks the finding "Witness: differs".

  • 0.2.3: The installer offers the recommended settings first (one Enter), and otherwise asks one question at a time with the recommended answer marked and the details behind "?", the same way as Kairos and Homonoia.

  • 0.2.2: For Homonoia's lab: astraea record <site> <address> checks the certificate one address serves, and astraea caa <site> "<CA>" says whether the site's CAA allows that CA. Witness notes read "Witness: agrees" when your other routers see the same CA or a CA the site allows.

  • 0.2.1: Versioning moves to 0.2 ahead of the beta. Right after boot Astraea no longer pauses with "no DNS intercept" while Kairos's intercept is already on. Notes after a finding read "CT: not found, Witness: differs".

  • 0.1.26: Ready for Homonoia, a separate add-on and its own opt-in: astraea record <site> prints this router's check of a site as one line, and when Homonoia is installed its verdicts (what your other routers see) appear next to findings. Astraea itself still never listens or talks to other routers.

  • 0.1.25: Encrypted DNS: an × clears a stale device (astraea dns forget <ip>; the allow list is not touched, and it comes back if it uses encrypted DNS again). Resolver addresses are kept as long as the device is shown, so a firewall restart no longer loses them; when none was recorded the row says so. "Managed by Astraea" moved into the DNS intercept's hover.

  • 0.1.24: Install (and astraea dns setup) lists devices whose DNS goes around your resolver by your own choice (DNS Director per-device rules, VPN Director Exclusive DNS), without changing them. "Not covered" now only counts lookups from the last 24 hours, the same window as Kairos, so a device that stops using your resolver shows up. astraea dns seen lists the resolvers each device tried, like the page. The DNS path row reads "Block DoT" and "Block DoH" (full names on hover) and fits on one line. A device that only looked up an encrypted-DNS server, with none of its DoT or DoH seen passing through the router, shows "lookup only".

  • 0.1.23: A site's own misconfiguration (CAA mismatch, expired certificate, missing intermediate, lifetime over 398 days, weak key or signature) can be acknowledged: its Ack button, or astraea ack <site> misconfig. It stays quiet for the exact certificate the site serves now and comes back if that certificate changes. High findings can never be acknowledged this way. The Encrypted DNS table lists the resolvers each device tried (up to three, newest first) under Uses and keeps Status to the verdict; every allowed device has a Remove button.

  • 0.1.22: The Encrypted DNS table shows which resolver each device tried ("DoH refused · 8.8.8.8", with the provider on hover; needs Kairos 0.9.48). Sites that served the very same certificate share one row in the certificate table ("…gvt1.com ×17", every name on hover), so "Show 25" counts certificates. The installer refuses a copy without its signature file. "Version:" in the page's corner; no more "alpha".

  • 0.1.21: Fewer, better alerts. The system log gets medium and high findings only. "Issued less than 24 hours ago" is no longer a finding of its own (with certificate lifetimes heading to 47 days, nearly every site has one); it stays part of the hijack check. A site that shows up on another edge of its CDN (where independent resolvers point, the same CA's certificate for the same names) is accepted quietly, and a "new network" notice is asked again at the site's next check, resolved once the resolvers agree, and gone after a week. Choose the two cross-check resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9 unfiltered, AdGuard non-filtering, Control D unfiltered, or off), with a warning when one is also your upstream. CT lookups have a threshold (off, high, medium and high, all) and ask crt.sh and Cert Spotter side by side; the result shows next to the finding. The page and astraea status say whether your resolver validates DNSSEC. Allowed devices stay "allowed" in the Encrypted DNS table while they sleep. A plain-language FAQ.

  • 0.1.20: The list of DoH/DoT server names Astraea recognises grows from about 30 to over 200 providers, built from the curl project's public DoH list and the DNSCrypt resolver lists, and now includes personal endpoints such as <id>.cloudflare-gateway.com (Cloudflare Zero Trust), <id>.dns.nextdns.io and <id>.d.adguard-dns.com. More devices using their own encrypted DNS show up in the Encrypted DNS table. Visibility only: nothing is blocked by a name.

  • 0.1.19: Encrypted DNS on the page: which devices use DoT, DoH to a major resolver, or look up a DoH server, with what the blocks do to each (refused, passes, allowed), and an Allow / Remove button per device (needs Kairos 0.9.44). DANE (TLSA) is now asked only for DNSSEC-signed domains, so _443._tcp. lookups no longer set off DNS tunnel detectors.

  • 0.1.18: Fewer false highs: a site served by more than one CDN (valid, CT-logged, CAA-allowed certificate on both paths) and a publicly trusted certificate that simply expired are now medium. Page: YYMMDD dates, one line per row (tables scroll sideways), long names and issuers shortened with the full value on hover, the Check column is a ✓ or ⓘ icon with details on hover, yellow now only means a warning, and the page says when dnsmasq log-queries is off. astraea intel also recognises Kairos's own lookups (self|asked by the router for Kairos).

  • 0.1.17: contained also for dnsmasq: names answered from Diversion's lists or a dnsmasq rule are read from dnsmasq's query log; AdGuard Home's custom rules and blocked services are labelled as such; long rules are shortened in astraea intel.

  • 0.1.16: astraea intel reports names your resolver blocked as contained (exit 3), with the blocklist, rule, query count and devices (AdGuard Home).

  • 0.1.15: astraea intel <name|address> and /tmp/astraea/intel.tsv: Astraea's evidence for other tools to confirm or clear their alerts (verdict and exit code), including a domain profile that tells CDN names from DNS tunnels; /tmp/astraea/selfq lists the names the router asked for Astraea.

  • 0.1.14: with dnsmasq as the resolver, its query log is read where dnsmasq writes it: a file set by log-facility (Diversion's query logging uses /opt/var/log/dnsmasq.log), or syslog. The overview and astraea status name the log in use.

  • 0.1.13: Astraea owns the DNS path: install checks that Kairos is established (0.9.38+, signed, NTP intercept on, trusted time), then, asking at each step, switches DNS Director to Router if it sends DNS elsewhere, exempts DNS servers on the LAN, and turns on the Kairos DNS intercept as managed by Astraea; uninstall puts it all back. Page: a DNS path row with DoT and DoH block checkboxes. astraea dns (status, setup, dot, doh). Checking pauses while the intercept is off.

  • 0.1.12: the DNS cross-check asks Cloudflare and Control D (was Google), reached at 1.1.1.1 and 76.76.2.0, so DoH blocklists in AdGuard Home or Pi-hole (HaGeZi and others) no longer silently disable it; a cross-check that gets no answer is logged.

  • 0.1.11: clean issuer changes (publicly trusted, CT-logged, known network or confirmed by independent resolvers) are accepted automatically and noted as info for a week; when independent resolvers disagree, the certificate where they point is fetched and compared (same key: accepted; the site's usual issuer with another key: high). Page: compact overview (3 rows), empty sections hidden, explanations on hover, findings in one line (details on hover), certificate failures that are not findings shown dimmed ("other name", "private CA"), a 10/25/50/all selector for recently checked certificates, the version at the top right. License: MIT.

  • 0.1.10: a CDN switching CAs inside its usual network is accepted quietly (logged); a move to another CDN confirmed by independent resolvers is medium, not high; the same CA written two ways ("Google Trust Services LLC" / "Google Trust Services") is one CA; the router's own address no longer appears in device lists.

  • 0.1.9: Ack buttons on the page; wide tables scroll inside the page instead of squeezing it, and addresses no longer break mid-number.

  • 0.1.8: checks the address a device was given; remembers each site's keys and networks and raises a CA change that comes with both (the shape of a DNS hijack), with an independent resolver cross-check; DANE (TLSA) checks; DNSSEC noted on CAA; CT timestamps checked against the trusted clock; days-off device clocks show their effect; devices not covered are listed.

  • 0.1.7: page layout fix.

  • 0.1.6: astraea ack all closes open issuer changes only and restarts the daemon once.

  • 0.1.5: the router's own lookups (including Astraea's) no longer count as a device using a site. A never-valid name answering with another name's certificate is not tracked (not an HTTPS site). Same CA with another root, or another CA under a root the site already uses (publicly trusted, CT-logged), is accepted quietly. CAA: DigiCert's other identifiers, "www." ignored. Weak crypto on never-valid sites is info. "Issued N h ago" clears after a day; info not seen for a week drops off.

  • 0.1.4: time is trusted only when chronyd follows an NTS server, a local reference clock or a LAN time server (before, any synchronised source counted). Long names wrap instead of widening the page.

  • 0.1.3: dnsmasq source: names answered through a CNAME chain were missed.

  • 0.1.2: CAA checks. The daemon keeps running when the SSH session that started it closes. Install checks its own signature first. The page hides info findings behind "Show info" and aligns text left; clearer wording for servers that do not send their intermediate certificate.

  • 0.1.1: certificate dates and roots were wrong on BusyBox (1970 dates, root "?"); status counts fixed. Severity now depends on whether the site was ever valid from here; the baseline covers every certificate and keeps up to 4 accepted issuers per site; an issuer change to a publicly trusted, CT-logged CA is medium instead of high.

Signed releases

Releases are signed with the same Ed25519 key as Kairos.

  • Install refuses a copy without a valid signature (astraea.sh.sig beside it).
  • Update refuses anything not signed with the release key, and never installs an older version unless you force it.
  • Self-check: when the daemon starts and every hour after that, the installed copy is checked against its signature. The result is in astraea status, the report and on the page (Updates & Alerts). A failure is logged as a warning; Astraea keeps running.
  • astraea verifyfile [file] [sig] checks any copy by hand.
  • astraea fingerprint shows the fingerprint of the release key this copy trusts (also at the top of the page). It is the same for Kairos, Astraea and Homonoia. It also shows the spare key, kept offline: a release signed with it is accepted too.

The self-check catches a damaged or altered script. It cannot catch someone who rewrites the script, the key inside it and the signature together; for that, compare the key's fingerprint with one published outside the repository.

What the signature covers, and what it does not

  • Covered: every update. The copy already on the router checks the new script against the release key it holds, before the new script runs, and refuses an older version.
  • A first install checks itself. The installer verifies its own signature with the key inside it, and a swapped script could simply skip that. For a first install, compare the fingerprint (astraea fingerprint, also at the top of the page) with the one the author publishes outside the repository, or check the download with verifyfile from a copy you already trust.
  • Not covered: everything else on the router. Add-ons run as root, and switching on custom scripts lets anything in /jffs/scripts run as root. amtm, Entware and the packages Astraea needs from it (jq, the CA bundle, OpenSSL 3 on older routers) come through their own installers, outside what this signature can vouch for. Entware fetches packages over plain HTTP unless you change that (Astraea's page says so when it does). Install only what you need.
  • The root certificates. The CA bundle decides which certificate authorities Astraea trusts in the end. Kairos 0.9.67 and later watches it: it reports every root added or removed, by name (kairos update-certs).

License

MIT License: use, copy, modify and distribute it freely, including in other products, as long as the copyright notice and license are kept. Releases up to 0.1.10 were published under GPL-3.0-or-later.